The Good Math blog continues to inadvertently provide examples of how subtle mistakes in cryptography are often fatal. I previously wrote about how slightly incorrect crypto examples on a reputable blog can lead engineers astray. The latest post about RSA is no exception, but I’ll have to write about it here since my comment was deleted. The comments by Oscar on that post are a good criticism.
The most important error in Mark’s description of RSA is that his example for encryption uses the private key D, instead of the public key E. The result of the RSA private key operation with D is called the “CipherText”. The decryption process is described using the public key E.
At first glance, this seems like an awkward description but still sound, right? If you wanted to exchange RSA-encrypted messages between two systems, couldn’t you just generate an RSA key pair and keep both keys secret? The surprising result is that this is completely insecure, and it is impossible to keep an RSA public key secret, even if the key (E, N) is never revealed.
I previously wrote a series of posts about a system that made this exact mistake. The manufacturer had burned an RSA public key (E, N) into a chip in order to verify a signature on code updates. This is perfectly fine, assuming the implementation was correct. However, they additionally wanted to use the same public key parameters to decrypt the message, keeping E and N secret. In the first article, I described this system and in the second, I discussed how to attack it given that the attacker has seen only two encrypted/signed updates. In summary, the modulus N is partially revealed by each message you see “encrypted” with (D, N) and the GCD quickly computes it.
Subtle details matter, especially in public key crypto. The two keys in an RSA pair are indeed asymmetric, and have very different properties. They cannot be substituted for each other. You cannot securely encrypt a message using the private key (D, N). Such a system would be completely insecure.
One thought on “More dangers of amateur crypto”
But the point should be any crypto RSA whateverxxxxx
Is only as good as how fast the keys changed, the length of the keys and the algorithm used to cypher
I would argue RSA is flawed in the above requirements just as the early DOD log based cyrpto were
nice point of a blunder, now where did that key book go….. like its safe in the safe?
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