rdist

February 24, 2008

Memory remanence attack analysis

Filed under: Crypto,Hacking,PC Architecture,Security,Software protection — Nate Lawson @ 6:00 am

You have probably heard by now of the memory remanence attack by Halderman et al. They show that it is easy to recover cryptographic keys from RAM after a reset or moving the DIMM to another system. This is important to any software that stores keys in RAM, and they targeted disk encryption. It’s a nice paper with a very polished but responsible publicity campaign, including a video.

Like most good papers, some parts of the attack were known for a long time and others were creative improvements. Memory remanence has been a known issue ever since the first key had to be zeroed after use. In the PC environment, the trusted computing efforts have been aware of this as well. (See “Hardware Attacks”, chapter 13 — S3 is suspend-to-ram and SCLEAN is a module that must be run during power-on to clear RAM). However, the Halderman team is publishing the first concrete results in this area and it should shake things up.

One outcome I do not want to see from this is a blind movement to closed hardware crypto (e.g., hard disk drives with onboard encryption). Such systems are ok in principle, but in practice often compromise security in more obvious ways than a warm reboot. For example, a hard drive that stores encryption keys in a special “lock sector” that the drive firmware won’t access without a valid password can be easily circumvented by patching the firmware. Such a system would be less secure in a cold power-on scenario than well-implemented software. The solution here is to ask vendors for documentation on their security implementation before making a purchase or only buy hardware that has been reviewed by a third-party with a report that matches your expectations. (Full disclosure: I perform this kind of review at Root Labs.)

Another observation is that this attack underlines the need to apply software protection techniques to other security applications besides DRM. If an attacker can dump your RAM, you need effective ways to hide the key in memory like white-box crypto, obfuscate and tamper-protect software that uses it, and randomize each install to prevent “break once, run everywhere” attacks. Yes, this is the exact same threat model DRM has faced for years but this time you care because you’re the target.

It will be interesting to see how vendors respond to this. Zeroing memory on reboot is an obvious change that addresses some of their methods. A more subtle hack is to set up page mapping and cache configuration such that the key is loaded into a cache line and never evicted (as done for fast IP routing table lookup in this awesome paper). However, none of this stops attacks that move the DIMM to another system. On standard x86 hardware, there’s no place other than RAM to put keys. However, the VIA C7 processors have hardware AES built into the CPU, and it’s possible more vendors will take this approach to providing secure key storage and crypto acceleration.

Whatever the changes, it will probably take a long time before this attack is effectively addressed. Set your encrypted volumes to auto-detach during suspend or a reasonable timeout and keep an eye on your laptop.

1 Comment

  1. I love the last part – best protection scheme so far: keep an eye on your laptop.

    Comment by one.miguel — February 24, 2008 @ 10:25 pm


RSS feed for comments on this post.

Blog at WordPress.com.