Following my recent posts on TLS/SSL security, I gave a talk (slides are here) on a security flaw in the record layer that was fixed in TLS 1.1. The last page of my slides gives some interesting links if you’re interested in understanding SSL security better.
This flaw (found by Bodo Moeller) is in the use of padding as part of the integrity protection of the actual data being exchanged. Padding is needed because block ciphers encrypt data in chunks and something has to go in the remainder of the last block. This attack is particularly interesting because it allows an attacker to iteratively decrypt part of the message using side-channel leakage.
Side channel attacks are still often neglected, despite proof that they can be performed over the Internet. System designers always seem to have the same initial response when learning about timing attacks: make the computation time constant by adding a calibrated delay. When problems in this strategy are pointed out, their next move is to add a random delay after the computation (not blinding).
This usually repeats with each approach getting shot down until they eventually admit this is a hard problem and that appropriate measures need to be integrated with the actual process (not bolted on) and carefully evaluated for unforeseen problems. For example, one fix for this attack is to always compute the MAC even if the padding is incorrect. However, the logic path of noting that the padding is incorrect but continuing anyway still requires a conditional branch, which creates a small but observable timing difference that can be used in a successful attack.
Preventing side channel attacks is a difficult problem. If confronted with them, take the time to get your countermeasures carefully evaluated.
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