Well-funded and motivated attackers are typically the hardest to defend against when designing a system. Governments can attack systems in different ways and with more resources than a typical threat. Consider a recent example where a British aide lost his Blackberry after spending the night with a woman who approached him in a Chinese disco. While it’s possible he just lost it while drunk, this is a good example of how unconventional threats need to be carefully considered.
Let’s analyze the cost of two routes to getting this same information: hacker or hooker. The hacker might try to crack passwords or develop a 0-day exploit against the Blackberry server. Or, build a custom trojan and send it via a forged email that appears to come from the Prime Minister. The hooker would try to get to his hotel room and steal the phone. It would actually suffice to just borrow it for a few minutes and dump the RAM since passwords are often cached there. This has the added advantage that he might never know anything had happened.
A 0-day exploit could be in the $20,000 range. Hiring someone to develop and target a trojan at this aide would be less, but the chance of succeeding would be lower. According to the stories about Eliot Spitzer, a high-end call girl is $1,500 per hour. Assuming it takes four hours, the total cost would be $6,000. The fact that both these approaches could be done in China means the actual cost would be lower but probably still a similar ratio.
There are a lot of other advantages to the hooker approach besides cost. There is good deniability if the call girl gets caught. Since the call girl remains within the attacking country’s jurisdiction, the police can be used to recover the Blackberry if she makes an extortion attempt. The hacker approach has a lot more uncertainty as flaws could be patched or blocked, making the exploit useless.
I also think this gives good support to my claim that software protection techniques are on the verge of wider adoption. With cold boot attacks and growing news of governments seizing laptops or stealing cell phones, systems must remain secure even when an attacker has physical possession of a powered-up device. The only way to do this is to adopt software and hardware techniques that are already used to protect games, DRM, and satellite TV. Traditional approaches like those used in network security are no longer enough.
I’ll be speaking on this topic along with Thomas Ptacek at WOOT, co-hosted at USENIX on July 28th in San Jose. Since this event is invite-only, send me email if you’re a security researcher who would like to attend. Please include a brief summary of your background.