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April 15, 2011

More certs may indicate less security

Filed under: Crypto,Network,Protocols,Security — Nate Lawson @ 12:40 pm

In my last post, I mentioned how warning users when a previously-seen cert changes may generate false positives for some sites. If a website has a multiple servers with different certs, the browser may often generate spurious errors for that site. But could this be a symptom of a genuine security problem?

Citibank appears to have one certificate per server. You can verify this yourself by going to their website and multiple times, clearing your browser each time. Clicking on the SSL icon to the left of the URL will show a different cert.

Here are the first 4 bytes of  three serial numbers of certs observed at Citibank:

  • 43:8e:67:66
  • 61:22:d4:81
  • 3e:f4:5b:7c

The Citibank certs are all identical except for a few fields. As you would expect, the domain name (CN) field is identical for each. The organizational unit (OU) differs (e.g., “olb-usmtprweb3″ versus “…web1″), but this field is not interpreted by browsers and is more of a convenience. The web server’s public key is different in each cert. And, of course, the serial number and signature fields also differ, as they should for all certs.

On the other hand, Wells Fargo appears to have only one cert. This cert (serial 41:c5:cd:90) is the same even after accessing their site via a proxy to ensure some load-balancing magic isn’t getting in the way. It’s easy to ignore this difference, but there might be something else going on.

Protecting the web server’s private key is one of the most important operational security duties. If it is discovered, all past and present encrypted sessions are compromised. (Yes, I know about DHE but it’s not widely used). After cleaning up the mess, the organization needs to get a new certificate and revoke the old one. This is no easy task as CRLs and OCSP both have their downsides.

One key question to ask an opsec department is “have you ever done a live cert revocation?” It’s one of those things that has to be experienced to be understood. In the recent Comodo fiasco, leaf cert revocations were embedded in browser software updates because the existing revocation mechanisms weren’t reliable enough.

Since web servers run commodity operating systems, most big sites use a hardware security module (HSM) to protect the private key. This is a dedicated box with some physical tamper resistance that is optimized for doing private key operations. By limiting the API to the server, HSMs can be hardened to prevent compromise, even if the server is hacked. The main downsides are that HSMs are expensive and may not live up to the original security guarantees as the API surface area grows.

Now, back to the two banks. Why would one have multiple certs but not the other? Certificates cost money, so if you’re offloading SSL to a single accelerator, there’s no reason to give it multiple certs. If each server has a dedicated HSM, you could use separate certs or just generate one and export it to all the others. You need to do this anyway for backup purposes.

This is just supposition, but one thing this could indicate is a different approach to securing the private key. Instead of generating one cert and private key, you create one per server and store it without an HSM. If a server gets compromised, you revoke the private key and move on. This might seem like a good idea to some since the cost of a cert must be lower than an HSM. However, the ineffectiveness of revocation today shows this to be a dangerous choice.

There may be other explanations for this. Perhaps Citi uses individual HSMs and Wells Fargo has a single SSL accelerator with plaintext HTTP in the backend. Perhaps they got a bargain on certs by buying in bulk. However, any time a system has more keys than necessary, it can lead to complicated key management. Or worse, it may indicate a weaker system design overall.

There’s no way to know the real story, but it’s good food for thought for anyone else who might be considering multiple certs as a substitute for strong private key protection. Cert revocation doesn’t currently work and should not be relied on.

April 6, 2011

Fixing the SSL cert nightmare

Filed under: Crypto,Protocols,Security — Nate Lawson @ 6:08 am

Recently, there has been an uproar as Comodo failed to do the one thing their business is supposed to do — issue certificates only to authenticated parties. (But what do you expect for a $5, few-questions-asked cert?) I’m glad there’s renewed focus on fixing the current CA and SSL browser infrastructure because this is one of the largest and most obvious security flaws in an otherwise successful protocol.

In response to this compromise, many people are recommending drastic changes. One really bad idea is getting rid of root certs in favor of SSH-style host verification. There are also some good proposals though:

Paring down number of root certs in common browsers

Root cert proliferation has gotten out-of-hand in all the major browsers. It would be great if someone analyzed which CAs are essential for all hostnames in the top 1000 sites. That info could be used to prune root certs to a smaller initial set.

It is unlikely the browser vendors will do this work themselves. They have clear financial and political incentives to add new CAs and few incentives to remove them. Even if you just consider the collateral damage to innocent sites when a root cert is removed, the costs can be huge.

The EFF had a promising start but not as much appears to have been done recently. However, they did publish this article including a list of CAs yesterday, sorted by number of times each CA signed an unqualified hostname. (Comodo is only second to Go Daddy, by the way, and Verisign is pretty high as well).

Notifying the user when a site’s cert changes

This is a pretty simple idea that has some merit. Your browser would cache the cert the first time you connect to a given server. If it changes when you revisit the site, you would get a warning. (Bonus: maintain a worldwide cache of these certs and correlate observations from various locations, like Perspectives or Google’s DNS-based cert history.)

This would have helped in the Comodo case but wouldn’t notify the user if the compromised CA were the same as the server’s current one. This scenario actually occurred in 2001 when Verisign issued another Microsoft code-signing cert to someone posing as an employee.

One usability problem of persistent cert chains is the fact that some sites use many different certs. For example, Citibank appears to have one cert per webserver, something we discuss more in our next post. This means users would get lots of spurious warnings when using their site.

Keep a hit count of CAs previously seen

This is a simple idea I came up with the other day that may be worth investigating. I’d like to see a CA “hit count” displayed alongside the list of root certs in my browser. This would help in auditing which certs are actually used by sites I visit and which are dormant. This could include the hostnames themselves as a collapsible list under each CA cert.

The important goal in considering all these proposals is to avoid making the problem worse. Nearly everyone agrees that the current situation has become untenable, and we need solutions to certificate problems now.

January 17, 2011

Stuxnet is embarrassing, not amazing

Filed under: Crypto,Hacking,Network,Reverse engineering,Security,Software protection — Nate Lawson @ 8:05 am

As the New York Times posts yet another breathless story about Stuxnet, I’m surprised that no one has pointed out its obvious deficiencies. Everyone seems to be hyperventilating about its purported target (control systems, ostensibly for nuclear material production) and not the actual malware itself.

There’s a good reason for this. Rather than being proud of its stealth and targeting, the authors should be embarrassed at their amateur approach to hiding the payload. I really hope it wasn’t written by the USA because I’d like to think our elite cyberweapon developers at least know what Bulgarian teenagers did back in the early 90’s.

First, there appears to be no special obfuscation. Sure, there are your standard routines for hiding from AV tools, XOR masking, and installing a rootkit. But Stuxnet does no better at this than any other malware discovered last year. It does not use virtual machine-based obfuscation, novel techniques for anti-debugging, or anything else to make it different from the hundreds of malware samples found every day.

Second, the Stuxnet developers seem to be unaware of more advanced techniques for hiding their target. They use simple “if/then” range checks to identify Step 7 systems and their peripheral controllers. If this was some high-level government operation, I would hope they would know to use things like hash-and-decrypt or homomorphic encryption to hide the controller configuration the code is targeting and its exact behavior once it did infect those systems.

Core Labs published a piracy protection scheme including “secure triggers”, which are code that only can be executed given a particular configuration in the environment. One such approach is to encrypt your payload with a key that can only be derived on systems that have a particular configuration. Typically, you’d concatenate all the desired input parameters and hash them to derive the key for encrypting your payload. Then, you’d do the same thing on every system the code runs on. If any of the parameters is off, even by one, the resulting key is useless and the code cannot be decrypted and executed.

This is secure except against a chosen-plaintext attack. In such an attack, the analyst can repeatedly run the payload on every possible combination of inputs, halting once the right configuration is found to trigger the payload. However, if enough inputs are combined and their ranges are not too limited, you can make such a brute-force attack infeasible. If this was the case, malware analysts could only say “here’s a worm that propagates to various systems, and we have not yet found out how to unlock its payload.”

Stuxnet doesn’t use any of these advanced features. Either the authors did not care if their payload was discovered by the general public, they weren’t aware of these techniques, or they had other limitations, such as time. The longer they remained undetected, the more systems that could be attacked and the longer Stuxnet could continue evolving as a deployment platform for follow-on worms. So disregard for detection seems unlikely.

We’re left with the authors being run-of-the-mill or in a hurry. If the former, then it was likely this code was produced by a “Team B”. Such a group would be second-tier in their country, perhaps a military agency as opposed to NSA (or the equivalent in other countries). It could be a contractor or loosely-organized group of hackers.

However, I think the final explanation is most likely. Whoever developed the code was probably in a hurry and decided using more advanced hiding techniques wasn’t worth the development/testing cost. For future efforts, I’d like to suggest the authors invest in a few copies of Christian Collberg’s book. It’s excellent and could have bought them a few more months of obscurity.

November 29, 2010

Final post on Javascript crypto

Filed under: Crypto,Network,Protocols,Security — Nate Lawson @ 7:00 am

The talk I gave last year on common crypto flaws still seems to generate comments. The majority of the discussion is by defenders of Javascript crypto. I made JS crypto a very minor part of the talk because I thought it would be obvious why it is a bad idea. Apparently, I was wrong to underestimate the grip it seems to have on web developers.

Rather than repeat the same rebuttals over and over, this is my final post on this subject. It ends with a challenge — if you have an application where Javascript crypto is more secure than traditional implementation approaches, post it in the comments. I’ll write a post citing you and explaining how you changed my mind. But since I expect this to be my last post on the matter, read this article carefully before posting.

To illustrate the problems with JS crypto, let’s use a simplified example application: a secure note-taker. The user writes notes to themselves that they can access from multiple computers. The notes will be encrypted by a random key, which is itself encrypted with a key derived from a passphrase. There are three implementation approaches we will consider: traditional client-side app, server-side app, and Javascript crypto. We will ignore attacks that are common to all three implementations (e.g., weak passphrase, client-side keylogger) and focus on their differences.

The traditional client-side approach offers the most security. For example, you could wrap PGP in a GUI with a notes field and store the encrypted files and key on the server. A client who is using the app is secure against future compromise of the server. However, they are still at risk of buggy or trojaned code each time they download the code. If they are concerned about this kind of attack, they can store a local copy and have a cryptographer audit it before using it.

The main advantage to this approach is that PGP has been around almost 20 years. It is well-tested and the GUI author is unlikely to make a mistake in interfacing with it (especially if using GPGME). The code is open-source and available for review.

If you don’t want to install client-side code, a less-secure approach is a server-side app accessed via a web browser. To take advantage of existing crypto code, we’ll use PGP again but the passphrase will be sent to it via HTTP and SSL. The server-side code en/decrypts the notes using GPGME and pipes the results to the user.

Compared to client-side code, there are a number of obvious weaknesses. The passphrase can be grabbed from the memory of the webserver process each time it is entered. The PGP code can be trojaned, possibly in a subtle way. The server’s /dev/urandom can be biased, weakening any keys generated there.

The most important difference from a client-side attack is that it takes effect immediately. An attacker who trojans a client app has to wait until users download and start using it. They can copy the ciphertext from the server, but it isn’t accessible until someone runs their trojan, exposing their passphrase or key. However, a server-side trojan takes effect immediately and all users who access their notes during this time period are compromised.

Another difference is that the password is exposed to a longer chain of software. With a client-side app, the passphrase is entered into the GUI app and passed over local IPC to PGP. It can be wiped from RAM after use, protected from being swapped to disk via mlock(), and generally remains under the user’s control. With the server-side app, it is entered into a web browser (which can cache it), sent over HTTPS (which involves trusting hundreds of CAs and a complex software stack), hits a webserver, and is finally passed over local IPC to PGP. A compromise of any component of that chain exposes the password.

The last difference is that the user cannot audit the server to see if an attack has occurred. With client-side code, the user can take charge of change management, refusing to update to new code until it can be audited. With a transport-level attack (e.g., sslstrip), there is nothing to audit after the fact.

The final implementation approach is Javascript crypto. The trust model is similar to server-side crypto except the code executes in the user’s browser instead of on the server. For our note-taker app, the browser would receive a JS crypto library over HTTPS. The first time it is used, it generates the user’s encryption key and encrypts it with the passphrase (say, derived via PBKDF2). This encrypted key is persisted on the server. The notes files are en/decrypted by the JS code before being sent to the server.

Javascript crypto has all the same disadvantages as server-side crypto, plus more. A slightly modified version of all the server-side attacks still works. Instead of trojaning the server app, an attacker can trojan the JS that is sent to the user. Any changes to the code immediately take effect for all active users. There’s the same long chain of software having access to critical data (JS code and the password processed by it).

So what additional problems make JS crypto worse than the server-side approach?

  1. Numerous libraries not maintained by cryptographers — With a little searching, I found: clipperz, etherhack, Titaniumcore, Dojo, crypto-js, jsSHA, jscryptolib, pidCrypt, van Everdingen’s library, and Movable Type’s AES. All not written or maintained by cryptographers. One exception is Stanford SJCL, although that was written by grad students 6 months ago so it’s too soon to tell how actively tested/maintained it will be.
  2. New code has not been properly reviewed and no clear “best practices” for implementers — oldest library I can find is 2 years old. Major platform-level questions still need to be resolved by even the better ones.
  3. Low-level primitives only — grab bag of AES, Serpent, RC4, and Caesar ciphers (yes, in same library). No high-level operations like GPGME. Now everyone can (and has to) be a crypto protocol designer.
  4. Browser is low-assurance environment — same-origin policy is not a replacement for ACLs, privilege separation, memory protection, mlock(), etc. JS DOM allows arbitrary eval on each element and language allows rebinding most operations (too much flexibility for crypto).
  5. Poor crypto support — JS has no secure PRNG such as /dev/urandom, side channel resistance is much more difficult if not impossible
  6. Too many platforms — IE, Firefox, Netscape, Opera, WebKit, Konqueror, and all versions of each. Crypto code tends to fail catastrophically in the face of platform bugs.
  7. Auditability — each user is served a potentially differing copy of the code. Old code may be running due to browser cache issues. Impossible for server maintainers to audit clients.

JS crypto is not even better for client-side auditability. Since JS is quite lenient in allowing page elements to rebind DOM nodes, even “View Source” does not reveal the actual code running in the browser. You’re only as secure as the worst script run from a given page or any other pages it allows via document.domain.

I have only heard of one application of JS crypto that made sense, but it wasn’t from a security perspective. A web firm processes credit card numbers. For cost reasons, they wanted to avoid PCI audits of their webservers, but PCI required any server that handled plaintext credit card numbers to be audited. So, their webservers send a JS crypto app to the browser client to encrypt the credit card number with an RSA public key. The corresponding private key is accessible only to the backend database. So based on the wording of PCI, only the database server requires an audit.

Of course, this is a ludicrous argument from a security perspective. The webserver is a critical part of the chain of trust in protecting the credit card numbers. There are many subtle ways to trojan RSA encryption code to disclose the plaintext. To detect trojans, the web firm has a client machine that repeatedly downloads and checksums the JS code from each webserver. But an attacker can serve the original JS to that machine while sending trojaned code to other users.

While I agree this is a clever way to avoid PCI audits, it does not increase actual security in any way. It is still subject to the above drawbacks of JS crypto.

If you’ve read this article and still think JS crypto has security advantages over server-side crypto for some particular application, describe it in a comment below. But the burden of proof is on you to explain why the above list of drawbacks is addressed or not relevant to your system. Until then, I am certain JS crypto does not make security sense.

Just because something can be done doesn’t mean it should be.

Epilogue

Auditability of client-side Javascript

I had overstated the auditability of JS in the browser environment by saying the code was accessible via “View Source”. It turns out the browser environment is even more malleable than I first thought. There is no user-accessible menu that tells what code is actually executing on a given page since DOM events can cause rebinding of page elements, including your crypto code. Thanks to Thomas Ptacek for pointing this out. I updated the corresponding paragraph above.

JS libraries such as jQuery, Prototype, and YUI all have APIs for loading additional page elements, which can be HTML or JS. These elements can rebind DOM nodes, meaning each AJAX query can result in the code of a page changing, not just the data displayed. The APIs don’t make a special effort to filter out page elements, and instead trust that you know what you’re doing.

The same origin policy is the only protection against this modification. However, this policy is applied at the page level, not script level. So if any script on a given page sets document.domain to a “safe” value like “example.net”, this would still allow JS code served from “ads.example.net” to override your crypto code on “www.example.net”. Your page is only as secure as the worst script loaded from it.

Brendan Eich made an informative comment on how document.domain is not the worst issue, separation of privileges for cross-site scripts is:

Scripts can be sourced cross-site, so you could get jacked without document.domain entering the picture just by <script src=”evil.ads.com”>. This threat is real but it is independent of document.domain and it doesn’t make document.domain more hazardous. It does not matter where the scripts come from. They need not come from ads.example.net — if http://www.example.net HTML loads them, they’re #include’d into http://www.example.net’s origin (whether it has been modified by document.domain or not).

In other words, if you have communicating pages that set document.domain to join a common superdomain, they have to be as careful with cross-site scripts as a single page loaded from that superdomain would. This suggests that document.domain is not the problem — cross-site scripts having full rights is the problem. See my W2SP 2009 slides.

“Proof of work” systems

Daniel Franke suggested one potentially-useful application for JS crypto: “proof of work” systems. These systems require the client to compute some difficult function to increase the effort required to send spam, cause denial of service, or bruteforce passwords. While I agree this application would not be subject to the security flaws listed in this article, it would have other problems.

Javascript is many times slower than native code and much worse for crypto functions than general computation. This means the advantage an attacker has in creating a native C plus GPU execution environment will likely far outstrip any slowness legitimate users will accept. If the performance ratio between attacker and legitimate users is too great, Javascript can’t be used for this purpose.

He recognized this problem and also suggested two ways to address it: increase the difficulty of the work function only when an attack is going on or only for guesses with weak passphrases. The problem with the first is that an attacker can scale up their guessing rate until the server slows down and then stay just below that threshold. Additionally, she can parallelize guesses for multiple users, depending on what the server uses for rate-limiting. One problem with the second is that it adds a round-trip where the server has to see the length of the attacker’s guess before selecting a difficulty for the proof-of-work function. In general, it’s better to select a one-size-fits-all parameter than to try to dynamically scale.

Browser plugin can checksum JS crypto code

This idea helps my argument, not hurts it. If you can deploy a custom plugin to clients, why not run the crypto there? If it can access the host environment, it has a real PRNG, crypto library (Mozilla NSS or Microsoft CryptoAPI), etc. Because of Javascript’s dynamism, no one knows a secure way to verify signatures on all page elements and DOM updates, so a checksumming plugin would not live up to its promise.

Scripts can be sourced cross-site, so you could get jacked without document.domain entering the picture just by <script src=”evil.ads.com”></script>. This threat is real but it is independent of document.domain and it doesn’t make document.domain more hazardous. It does not matter where the scripts come from. They need not come from ads.example.net — if http://www.example.net HTML loads them, they’re #include’d into http://www.example.net‘s origin (whether it has been modifeid by document.domain or not).

In other words, if you have communicating pages that set document.domain to join a common superdomain, they have to be as careful with cross-site scripts as a single page loaded from that superdomain would.

This suggests that document.domain is not the problem — cross-site scripts having full rights is the problem. See my W2SP 2009 slides.

November 19, 2010

DSA requirements for random k value

Filed under: Crypto,Protocols,Security — Nate Lawson @ 2:33 pm

Most public key systems fail catastrophically if you ignore any of their requirements. You can decrypt RSA messages if the padding is not random, for example. With DSA, many implementation mistakes expose the signer’s private key.

Many crypto protocols use a nonce. The traditional requirements of a nonce is that it never be repeated. So a simple counter can suffice, as long as it is safely persisted. Using a timestamp is problematic if the clock ever goes backwards (say, NTP) or you need to generate two messages in a short interval.

In DSA, the k value is not a nonce. In addition to being unique, the value must be unpredictable and secret. This makes it more like a random session key than a nonce. When an implementer gets this wrong, they expose the private key, often with only one or two signatures.

If k is predictable, there is a way to recover the private key from a single signature with straightforward algebra. Since a past weakness in the Debian PRNG resulted in only 32767 possible outputs, an attacker could recover any DSA private key where a single signature was generated on a vulnerable Debian system. The key could have been generated securely on a system without this flaw, but that single signature would compromise it.

But what about the requirement that k be unique? Assume there’s an email signing system that has a secure PRNG but it is rate-limited so two requests that come in quickly from the same process produce the same output. As an attacker, you can’t predict k but you suspect the signing system may have this weakness.

To generate a DSA signature, the signer calculates (r, s) as follows:

r = gk mod p mod q
s = k-1 (H(m) + x*r) mod q

If you see a repeated r value, then you know k has been repeated. Build a web crawler to find DSA signatures. Dump its output into a parser for a bunch of formats (X509v3, PGP, PKCS#7, etc.) From each signature file, insert each r value into a key-value database and look for a match. If you find any two matching r values, you can recover the signer’s private key.

The algebra to do so is pretty straightforward. Given two signatures for messages MA and MB, we want to solve for k.

SA = k-1 (H(MA) + x*r) mod q
SB = k-1 (H(MB) + x*r) mod q

Subtract the two signatures. (The modular reduction step is implicit from here on for readability.)

SASB = k-1 (HA + x*r) – k-1 (HB + x*r)

Redistribute. Since the k’s are identical, their inverse is also.

SASB = k-1 (HA + x*r – HBx*r)

The x*r values cancel out.

SASB = k-1 (HA – HB)

Redistribute.

k = (HA – HB) / (SASB)

Once you have k, you can solve for x directly as in the previous post. There is a more complicated technique for solving for x if only a few bits of k are known, requiring more signatures.

It is extremely important that all bits of k be unique, unpredictable, and secret. With two DSA signatures on separate messages with the same k, you can recover the signer’s private key.

November 9, 2010

Blackhat 2010 video on remote timing attacks

Filed under: Crypto,Hacking,Network,Protocols,Security — Nate Lawson @ 10:32 am

The Blackhat staff recently posted the video and slides from our talk on remote timing attacks. You can watch the talk via the playlist below. While there wasn’t enough time to go into detail in every aspect, I think this talk gives a good explanation why developers should take these attacks seriously.

Our conclusions can be summarized as:

  • Surprisingly small timing differences are visible from remote (< 40 ns LAN, < 25 μs Internet in this talk). This is an improvement over previously published results.
  • Many factors thought to prevent timing attacks, including geographical distance and competing server load, do not have as big an effect as tradition suggests.
  • Many common crypto libraries have timing leaks and some are exploitable.
  • If you deliver software as a product, you can’t make assumptions about your customer’s threat model for side channel leaks. They may just be on Slicehost or EC2 or use a slow embedded processor.
  • Since some routines that leak timing information (such as “terminate early compare”) are easy to fix, it’s better to be conservative than hope your customer’s environment prevents exploitation.

Since giving this talk at Blackhat, we have an updated version with new results. I had hoped to post it now, but it turns out that  perfect is still the enemy of “good enough”. We’ll have more on that soon. In the meantime, I hope this talk is helpful to you.

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